This blog accompanies the website New Electric Politics (http://ceolas.net/).
The website sets out how to achieve energy efficiency overall and in relation to electricity: relevantly and significantly via generation and distribution rather than via consumption.
In terms of energy markets, any shortage of a resource, as seen well in advance by energy reserve figures, raises price, reduces use, and favors other resource use - without regulations.
This automatically carries through to consumption, as in the 1970s when oil shortage raised price and favored sales of fuel efficient cars without the need for fuel efficiency regulations which affect car characteristics and choice.
Unlike energy use, reduction of noxious emissions (whatever about CO2) may need legislation whether on power plants or cars, but should then apply equally to all potential energy sources, without today's political favoritism.
If targeting products to reduce consumption is still seen as necessary, it is again more appropriately dealt with by market competition or for that matter taxation measures, rather than regulation.
Certainly, product standards usefully inform of choices and facilitate trade, but they don't thereby necessitate bans on otherwise safe products (which can simply be lower graded).
The problem with energy efficiency regulations are covered with reference to buildings, cars, household white goods, and other electrical and electronic products.
The extensive light bulb section then serves as a specific illustrative example why energy efficiency regulation justifications don't hold up, whether in supposed energy, emission or money savings, or to "stimulate" manufacturers to make better "energy saving" products, quite apart from considerations of overall product choice.
